War and autocephaly in Ukraine by Hovorun, Cyril
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School 
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount 
University and Loyola Law School 
Theological Studies Faculty Works Theological Studies 
2020 
War and autocephaly in Ukraine 
Cyril Hovorun 
Loyola Marymount University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/theo_fac 
 Part of the Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hovorun C. War and Autocephaly in Ukraine. Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal. 2020;7:1–25. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Theological Studies at Digital Commons @ Loyola 
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theological Studies Faculty 
Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. 






Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal 7 (2020): 1–25
National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
War and Autocephaly in Ukraine
War and Autocephaly in Ukraine
Cyril Hovorun
Stockholm School of Theology
Abstract
A series of conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union culminated in the war 
in Ukraine waged by Russia in 2014. The international community was taken by surprise, 
and its reactions to the Russian aggression were often confused and inadequate. Even 
more confused and inadequate were the responses from global Christianity. Russian 
propaganda often renders the aggression against Ukraine as a quasi- religious conflict: a 
“holy war” against the “godless” or “heterodox” West. It would be natural, therefore, for 
the Christian churches worldwide to loudly condemn both propaganda and aggression. 
However, in most cases, their response was silence. Such reactions came from most 
local Orthodox churches, the Roman Catholic church, and international ecumenical 
organizations such as the World Council of Churches. An exception was the reaction 
from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which decided to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox 
Church of Ukraine. The article argues that the Tomos for autocephaly was, among 
other reasons, a reaction to the war in Ukraine. The responses of other local Orthodox 
churches to the Tomos also indicate their attitude to the war in Ukraine. These reactions 
have demonstrated a profound crisis in inter- Orthodox solidarity and social ethics.
Key Words: war, church diplomacy, Tomos, autocephaly, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 
the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
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Casus Belli
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not cause immediate full- scale wars 
between Russia and the independent states that emerged from the USSR. There were 
some military conflicts on the post- Soviet periphery, such as between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno- Karabakh (Artsakh) in 1991–1994 and 
recently in 2020, in Tajikistan in 1992–1997, in the Georgian regions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia in 1991–1993 and later in 1998, in the Moldovan region of Transnistria in 
1990–1992. Although Russia had hidden involvement in most of these conflicts, it acted 
mostly through its proxies, not directly.
The first open intervention of Russia in another post- Soviet state happened in 
August 2008 in the Republic of Georgia. As a result of this intervention by regular 
Russian troops, Georgia lost control over twenty percent of its territory. Russia’s 
war against Georgia was not adequately evaluated and addressed by the West. This 
encouraged Russian President Vladimir Putin to attempt to wage a war of a much larger 
scale. He launched such a war against Ukraine after the victory of the Revolution of 
Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal 7 (2020)2
Dignity in 2014. Russian military troops first annexed the Crimean Peninsula and then, 
assisted by local collaborators, entered Ukraine on its eastern border. Putin planned 
to establish Russian control over the entire Southeast of the country in order to make 
a corridor to Crimea. However, because of the resistance of the Ukrainian army and 
volunteer battalions, the Russians, together with local separatists, managed to occupy 
only some parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
The human cost of the war is enormous. According to the report of the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
in its seventh year, the conflict in Donetska and Luhanska oblasts 
in eastern Ukraine continues to significantly impact the lives of 
more than five million people living in the region, 3.4 million of 
whom require humanitarian assistance and protection services. 
Since the start of the conflict in 2014, more than 3,350 civilian 
men, women and children have been killed and another 7,000 
have been injured. As the crisis persists, civilians continue to bear 
the brunt of the conflict. Fear of shelling, violent clashes, and the 
threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war are the daily 
reality for millions of people living on both sides of the more than 
420 kilometer- long “contact line” — equivalent to the length of the 
French- German border. Today, eastern Ukraine is considered one 
of the most mine- contaminated areas in the world.1
The war claimed around 13 thousand lives, of whom one third are civilians. Over 
30 thousand people have been wounded.2 Among the war victims are 283 passengers 
and 15 crew members of a Malaysia Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur 
(MH17), which was shot down on July 17, 2014. The Joint Investigation Team (JIT), led by 
the Dutch government, established that the plane was shot down by the sophisticated 
Buk Russian military anti- aircraft missile system, which was brought from Russia to 
Ukrainian territory controlled by the separatists.3 There is another outcome of the 
war, which has to do with severe violations of human rights by Russia. There are over 
1 “Ukraine. Situation Report,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
last updated October 27, 2020, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y49o2qov.
2 Christopher Miller, “ 13 tysiach: ofitsiini dani OON shchodo zahyblykh u viini na Donbasi [13 
Thousand: Official UN Data on Those Killed in the War in the Donbas],” Radio Svoboda, 26 
February, 2019, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y6xw27w9.
3 Dutch foreign minister Stef Blok made a statement after the JIT finished its investigation: “On 
the basis of the JIT’s conclusions, the Netherlands and Australia are now convinced that Russia 
is responsible for the deployment of the Buk installation that was used to down MH17. The 
government is now taking the next step by formally holding Russia accountable.” See “MH17: 
The Netherlands and Australia Hold Russia Responsible,” Government of the Netherlands, May 
25, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y38nhcn2.
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five thousand Ukrainians held for political reasons in prisons in Russia and occupied 
Crimea.4 The best known political prisoner was Ukrainian film director Oleg Sentsov. 
He was arrested in Crimea for opposing its annexation and sentenced by a Russian 
court to twenty years in prison (subsequently released in 2019 in a prisoner exchange).
Reactions of the International Community
The aggressive activities of Russia against Ukraine took the international community 
by surprise. Most international organizations and states expressed their support to 
Ukraine, even though it was more in words than in deeds. Still, the words were clear 
and quite strong. Thus, soon after the annexation of Crimea, the General Assembly 
of the United Nations discussed and adopted on March 27, 2014, a resolution, which 
confirmed that the peninsula continues to belong to Ukraine. 100 countries voted 
for the resolution, 11 against, and 58 abstained.5 The U. N. also strongly condemned 
the downing of flight MH17. This issue was discussed by the Security Council, which 
adopted on July 21, 2014, a relevant resolution.6 The identification and condemnation 
of the Russian aggression against Ukraine was never an easy task in the United Nations. 
As a permanent member of its Security Council, Russia has the right to veto any of its 
decisions. It has often used this right to block decisions in favor of Ukraine.7
The European Parliament is less restricted in standing up to Russia. It adopted 
a series of resolutions that supported the integrity of Ukraine and condemned the 
Russian aggression against it. For instance, in its resolution on September 18, 2014, it 
declared that it “strongly condemns the Russian Federation for waging an undeclared 
‘hybrid war’ against Ukraine with use of regular Russian forces and supporting illegally 
armed groups.” 8 The European Parliament also systematically addressed the issue of 
human rights on the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russian or pro- Russian forces.9 In 
particular, it condemned the imprisonment of Oleg Sentsov and demanded that Russia 
4 See information from the office of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights 
available at http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/ua/page/secretariat/gromadskist/ukraiinski- 
politvyazni.html.
5 UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, A/RES/68/262, 
March 27, 2014, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y55fo8dz.
6 UN Security Council Resolution 2166 (2014), S/RES/2166 (2014), July 21, 2014, accessed 
December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/yxvb5x36.
7 Such as, for example, UN Security Council draft resolution S/2014/189 on March 15, 2014, 
accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y2olofp9.
8 European Parliament Resolution 2014/2841 (RSP), On the Situation in Ukraine and the State of 
Play of EU- Russia Relations, September 18, 2014, P8_TA(2014)0025, accessed December 5, 2020, 
https://tinyurl.com/y2afpumg.
9 European Parliament Resolution 2016/2556 (RSP), On the Human Rights Situation in Crimea, 
in Particular of the Crimean Tatars, February 4, 2016, P8_TA(2016)0043, accessed December 5, 
2020, https://tinyurl.com/y48zahgf.
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release him.10 The E. U. also imposed economic sanctions on Russia as an instrument 
of political pressure.11
Even more restrictive have been the measures taken against Russia by the United 
States of America.12 All branches of government in the United States adopted numerous 
decisions and resolutions condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine. For example, 
a resolution sponsored by Rep. Ted Poe (R- TX-2) addressed the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova (whose Transnistria territory is controlled by a Russian- 
backed political regime). Among other statements, it called “the Russian Federation 
to immediately cease its military support to illegal paramilitary units operating within 
the internationally recognized territories of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova,” to “cease 
its destabilizing activities in Transnistria in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 
Georgia, and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, as well as to terminate its 
forcible and illegal annexation of Crimea.” 13
Reactions of Churches in Ukraine
There is an interfaith network in Ukraine, which has issued equally strong messages 
regarding the Russian aggression. It is the All- Ukrainian Council of Churches and 
Religious Organizations (AUCCRO), an independent ecumenical platform, where 
representatives of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim communities regularly meet 
together and discuss issues important for them and for the entire Ukrainian society. 
The AUCCRO was established in 1996 on an initiative of President Leonid Kuchma 
(1994–2005). Soon, however, the council became independent from the state and now 
functions in the capacity of a non- governmental organization. It constitutes one of the 
most successful examples of inter- Christian and inter- faith cooperation in Europe. Even 
when churches or religious organizations hesitate to speak up on their own regarding 
various public or religious issues, they use the AUCCRO platform to unite their voices 
with other groups in advocating for common causes.
Since the beginning of the protests at the Maidan in December 2013, the AUCCRO 
has repeatedly urged Ukrainian authorities to avoid violence against peaceful 
10 European Parliament Resolution 2018/2754(RSP), On Russia, Notably the Case of Ukrainian 
Political Prisoner Oleg Sentsov, June 14, 2018, P8_TA(2018)0259, accessed December 5, 2020, 
https://tinyurl.com/yxo8v8zv.
11 See “EU Restrictive Measures in Response to the Crisis in Ukraine,” Delegation of the European 
Union to Russia, August 10, 2017, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y6noddx9.
12 See their list on the website of the US Department of State: https://www.state.gov/ukraine- and- 
russia- sanctions/.
13 US House of Representatives, Resolution Affirming United States Support to the Nations of 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova in Their Effort to Retain Political Sovereignty and Territorial 
Integrity, June 20, 2018, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Res. 955, accessed December 5, 2020, https://
tinyurl.com/y2hhqoke.
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protesters.14 After the first casualties at the Maidan, the members of the AUCCRO stepped 
in and offered mediation between the leaders of the Maidan and the government.15 
When Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted, and Oleksandr Turchynov 
replaced him as acting president, the members of the AUCCRO met with the acting 
president. After the meeting, they issued a public statement in which they recognized 
the transition of political power as legitimate.16
On March 1, 2014, the Russian Federation Council voted to grant permission to use 
Russian military forces against Ukraine. In response to this decision, which effectively 
opened the door for a declaration of war, the AUCCRO issued a statement addressed 
to Russian authorities. It urged them
to give up military or any other interference into the internal 
affairs of Ukraine that are not provided by international law and 
bilateral agreements. The Russian authorities ought to realize their 
responsibility before God and mankind for possible irrecoverable 
consequences of the military conflict on Ukrainian territory.17
During the years of the war that followed, the AUCCRO repeatedly addressed 
humanitarian issues, which emerged as a result of Russian aggression. The Council 
supported the self- defense of Ukraine 18 and urged Russia to release hostages and 
14 “Zvernennia Vseukrainskoi Rady Tserkov u zviazku z suspilno- politychnoiu sytuatsiieiu v 
Ukraini [Statement of the All- Ukrainian Council of Churches Regarding the Social and Political 
Situation in Ukraine],” VRTsIRO, December 10, 2013, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.
com/y5y6pkal; “Zvernennia Vseukrainskoi Rady Tserkov z nahody Dnia Sobornosti ta Svobody 
Ukrainy [Statement of the All- Ukrainian Council of Churches on Occasion of the Ukrainian 
Unity and Liberty Day],” VRTsIRO, January 22, 2014, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.
com/yyqb6fk9.
15 “Rada Tserkov zaklykaie vidnovyty konstytutsiinyi lad ta povnotu prav i svobod hromadian 
(zaiava) [The Council of Churches Calls for the Restoration of the Constitutional Order and the 
Fullness of Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms (Statement)],” Instytut Relihiinoi Svobody, January 25, 
2014, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y4ckzjno.
16 “Zaiava za pidsumkamy zustrichi z kerivnytstvom Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy [Statement 
Following the Meeting with the Leadership of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine],” VRTsIRO, 
February 26, 2014, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y6rgyam6.
17 “Zaiava Rady Tserkov shchodo rishennia Rosii pro viiskove vtorhnennia v Ukrainu [The Council 
of Churches Statement on Russia’s Decision on the Military Invasion of Ukraine],” VRTsIRO, 
March 2, 2014, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y43vsd72.
18 “Zvernennia Vseukrainskoi Rady Tserkov i relihiinykh orhanizatsii pro oboviazok dopomohy 
u zakhysti Batkivshchyny [Appeal of the All- Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious 
Organizations on the Obligation to Assist in the Defense of the Motherland],” VRTsIRO, 
February 10, 2015, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y4ukkmh7.
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prisoners of war,19 as well as political activists.20 It also encouraged the faithful of 
its member churches and religious groups to become volunteers 21 and inspired the 
volunteers to visit and bring relief to soldiers and civilians on the front line.22
In coherence with the statements promulgated by the All- Ukrainian Council 
of Churches and Religious Organizations, its two Orthodox members, namely the 
Patriarchate of Kyiv and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, produced 
their own statements. They explicitly condemned the Russian aggression against 
Ukraine and provided relief to those affected by the war. In contrast to them, the 
largest Orthodox jurisdiction in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), 
which is in unity with the Moscow Patriarchate, refused to acknowledge the Russian 
aggression and instead systematically used euphemisms to avoid calling it such.23 This 
policy dramatically contrasted with the policies of other Ukrainian Orthodox churches, 
and even with its policies in the first months of the Russian aggression. Thus, at the 
beginning of March 2014, the locum tenens of the Kyivan see, Metropolitan Onufriy, 
later elected the Primate of the UOC, publicly urged the Patriarch of Moscow and the 
President of Russia to stop the Russian intervention in Ukraine.24
The rhetoric of the UOC denying the war also went against the positions of the 
same church in the frame of the All- Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious 
Organizations. The presidency in the AUCCRO rotates every half year. During the 
period of the Maidan and at the beginning of the Russian aggression, it was the turn of 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate to preside at meetings 
19 “Rada Tserkov zaklykaie zvilnyty zaruchnykiv z polonu na Donbasi [The Council of Churches 
Calls for the Release of Hostages From Captivity in the Donbas],” VRTsIRO, September 8, 2016, 
accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y6e6c9w9.
20 “Rada Tserkov hotuie zvernennia na pidtrymku ukrainskikh viazniv Kremlia [The Council 
of Churches is Preparing an Appeal in Support of Ukrainian Kremlin Prisoners],” Religion in 
Ukraine, June 13, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y2puawnu.
21 “Zvernennia Vseukrainskoi Rady Tserkov na pidtrymku blahodiinytstva i volonterskoi dialnosti 
[Appeal of the All- Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations for the Support 
of Charity and Volunteer Activity],” VRTsIRO, October 31, 2014, accessed December 5, 2020, 
https://tinyurl.com/y5fdqgdx.
22 “Zvernennia Vseukrainskoi Rady Tserkov i relihiinykh orhanizatsii [Appeal of the All- Ukrainian 
Council of Churches and Religious Organizations],” VRTsIRO, April 12, 2017, accessed December 
5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y2uep3dy.
23 See for example the interview of the official speaker of this church Bishop Klyment (Vecheria): 
Hromadske, “Yepyskop Klyment: Vladyka Pavlo ne kupuvav sobi avto ta maietok — tse 
pozhertvy [Bishop Klyment: Bishop Pavlo Did Not Buy Himself a Car and an Estate — These are 
Donations],” YouTube Video, 55:35, October 8, 2015, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.
com/yye3segc.
24 Fotolitopys UPTs, “Zvernennia Mytropolyta Onufriia Mistsebliustytelia Kyivskoi mytropolychoi 
kafedry [The Address of Metropolitan Onufriy, Acting Head of the Kyivan See],” YouTube Video, 
5:02, March 2, 2014, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y279ngvw.
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of the council and to sign statements on behalf of all members. Thus, critical AUCCRO 
documents supporting public protests, urging the Yanukovych government to avoid 
violence, and condemning Russia for its intervention, were signed by representatives 
of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine.
Reactions from Global Orthodoxy
Official statements of the UOC (in contrast to its signatures under the statements of the 
AUCCRO) did not significantly differ from statements of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
This church did not keep silent on the war in Ukraine. On the contrary, it developed a 
narrative to explain the war to its faithful. According to this narrative, the Revolution 
of Dignity was a rebellion against the lawful government of President Yanukovych. 
The president and government that succeeded them are not legitimate. The Maidan 
reoriented Ukrainian society from the allegedly “holy Russia” to the allegedly “godless 
West.” The war in the East of the country became a reaction to the u- turn that Ukrainian 
society made towards the West. Its primary cause was to protect the Christian values of 
Russia against the allegedly anti- Christian corruption of values coming from the West.
Not a single statement promulgated by the Russian Orthodox Church acknowledged 
Russian involvement in the war. Instead, these statements insistently applied to the 
war the ambivalent euphemism of “fratricide.” This word, on the one hand, implies a 
fight between brothers in faith, regardless of their nationality. Indeed, the majority of 
those fighting in the East of Ukraine, on both sides, are Orthodox Christians. However, 
spokesmen of the Russian church insist that the pro- Ukrainian side of the war is not 
Orthodox but predominantly Uniate. From the Russian position, Uniates are not 
brothers in Christ of those fighting on the pro- Russian side of the conflict. The word 
“fratricide” from the Russian point of view, therefore, implies peoples of the same 
nationality. This euphemism became a synonym for civil war and is propagated by the 
Kremlin through the Russian media. In tune with this propaganda, the Patriarch of 
Moscow Kirill introduced a special prayer about Ukraine in all churches of the Moscow 
Patriarchate:
O Lord Jesus Christ our God, look down with your merciful eye 
upon the sorrow and painful cry of your children, who are in 
Ukrainian lands. Deliver your people from the civil strife, quench 
the bloodshed, divert the ongoing misfortunes. House those 
deprived of roofs over their heads, feed the hungry, console those 
who cry, unite those who are divided… 25
25 “Molitva o prekrashchenii mezhdousobnyia brani na Bozhestvennoi liturgii po suguboi 
ektenii chtomaia [A Prayer on the Termination of Fratricide for the Divine Liturgy],” Russkaia 
Pravoslavnaia Tserkov, June 17, 2014, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y6xcfwnx.
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While encouraging the faithful to pray for the undoubtedly good cause of charity, 
the prayer also makes them perceive the war as civil — one of the main points of Russian 
propaganda. The prayer, thus, was itself transformed into an instrument of propaganda. 
Even the humanitarian aid offered by the Russian church to those in need in the East 
of Ukraine was not wholly free from political bias. It went to only one side of the 
conflict, which is pro- Russian. It should be acknowledged, though, that the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate offered humanitarian aid to both sides 
of the conflict. In its rhetoric, however, as it was mentioned, it was coherent with the 
narratives produced by the Russian Orthodox Church.
The standpoint of the Russian church regarding the annexation of Crimea is as 
ambivalent as its words and deeds regarding the war in the Donbas. On the one hand, 
the Moscow Patriarchate kept the dioceses in Crimea under the jurisdiction of Kyiv. 
The Crimean bishops attend the sessions of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church. It should also be noted that the Patriarch did not attend President Vladimir 
Putin’s reception on the occasion of the annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014. The 
Patriarch did not show up in the Kremlin for this occasion not because he disagreed 
with the Kremlin, but because both the church and the Kremlin did not want to give 
Constantinople an excuse to intervene in the Ukrainian situation.
In contrast to the Russian Orthodox Church, which often spoke on Ukraine, always 
in coherence with the Kremlin, the rest of the Orthodox churches kept silent. Their 
silence is as disturbing as the many words uttered by the Russian church. They have 
consistently ignored both wars on the European continent that involve Orthodox 
nations, in Georgia and Ukraine. They even failed to address the humanitarian crises 
caused by these wars. The silence of the Orthodox churches on the European wars that 
involved Orthodox nations has demonstrated a considerable deficiency of Panorthodox 
unity and solidarity.
At the same time, to some Orthodox churches and hierarchs, the war gave an 
opportunity to blame the West and the Catholic church in particular. The narrative 
of the Russian church that put all blame for the Ukrainian revolution and war on the 
Greek Catholics was accepted by those who believe in the Catholic conspiracy against 
the Orthodox. A disturbingly large number of Orthodox hierarchs, clergy, and faithful 
have interpreted the war in Ukraine as a conflict between the Orthodox and Catholic 
churches. Some leaders of Orthodox and Catholic churches realized the danger for 
their relations coming from such misinterpretations of the reasons for the Ukrainian 
war. When Pope Francis and Patriarch Bartholomew met in Istanbul in November 2014, 
they issued a joint statement, where they gently touched on this issue:
We also remember all the people who experience the sufferings 
of war. In particular, we pray for peace in Ukraine, a country of 
ancient Christian tradition, while we call upon all parties involved 
to pursue the path of dialogue and of respect for international law 
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in order to bring an end to the conflict and allow all Ukrainians to 
live in harmony.26
In the same statement, the Pope and the Ecumenical Patriarch said much more 
about the conflicts in the Middle East. Nevertheless, even this laconic phrase in the 
statement revealed more about the nature of the conflict than any other Orthodox 
church. In particular, their call to respect international law was a clear reference to 
the decisions of the international community, which condemned the annexation of 
Crimea and the Russian- backed war in the East of Ukraine.
Reactions from the Roman Catholic Church
The Istanbul declaration chartered a general framework for Pope Francis’s following 
rhetoric on Ukraine. This rhetoric stresses the need for peace and reconciliation. It 
occasionally invokes the need to restore international order but never blames Russia 
for what has happened. Such was, for instance, one of his messages Urbi et Orbi for the 
Easter of 2015:
May the Lord’s resurrection bring light to beloved Ukraine, 
especially to those who have endured the violence of the conflict 
of recent months. May the country rediscover peace and hope 
thanks to the commitment of all interested parties.27
In a few cases, Pope Francis’s language turned from vague to ambivalent. During 
one of his general audiences, for example, he called the war in Ukraine by a term from 
the vocabulary of Russian propaganda: fratricide.28
Pope Francis was more cautious in choosing words for the declaration that he 
signed together with the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Kirill in Havana, Cuba, 
where they met on February 12, 2016. The declaration called upon the sides of the 
conflict for dialogue and reconciliation:
We deplore the hostility in Ukraine that has already caused many 
victims, inflicted innumerable wounds on peaceful inhabitants 
and thrown society into a deep economic and humanitarian 
crisis. We invite all the parts involved in the conflict to prudence, 
26 “Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Turkey: Ecumenical Blessing and Singing 
of the Common Declaration,” The Holy See, November 30, 2014, accessed December 5, 2020, 
https://tinyurl.com/y2ba9doj.
27 “Urbi et Orbi Message of His Holiness Pope Francis (Easter 2015),” The Holy See, April 5, 2015, 
accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y3tl5ght.
28 “Pope Decries ‘Fratricide’ Conflict in Ukraine and Appeals for Dialogue,” Vatican Radio, 
February 4, 2015, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y29sagh6.
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to social solidarity and to action aimed at constructing peace. We 
invite our Churches in Ukraine to work towards social harmony, to 
refrain from taking part in the confrontation, and to not support 
any further development of the conflict.29
It should be noted that in this statement, the war in Ukraine was not called “civil,” 
even though earlier in the same text, the conflicts in the Middle East were characterized 
as civil.30 Those who were close to the process of drafting the document have informed 
the author of this article that the original draft of the declaration, which was prepared 
in collaboration with the Russian side, contained the word “civil” in application to the 
war in Ukraine. It was, however, eliminated in the last moment of preparations, on the 
insistence of the Vatican side.
While calling upon “the parts involved in the conflict” to engage in dialogue, the 
declaration did not identify the conflict’s sides. Nor did it say a word about the role 
of Russia. The text paints Russia in bright colors, as a country with “unprecedented 
renewal of the Christian faith.” In contrast to it, Ukraine is painted in dark colors, as a 
country in “deep economic and humanitarian crisis.” This counterposition of the two 
countries is coherent with the message propagated by the Russian media. These and 
other words that have been said and that have not been said in the Havana declaration 
embarrassed many people in Ukraine. Many of them were Greek Catholics.
In parallel to producing statements, the Catholic Church developed a significant 
humanitarian mission in Ukraine. Pope Francis initiated a project called “Pope for 
Ukraine.” 31 He donated personally to the charitable fund and asked that Catholic 
parishes throughout Europe take up special collections for the same purpose. This 
fund, together with other Catholic charitable missions in Ukraine, offers humanitarian 
aid to the internally displaced persons and to those civilians who remain in the war 
zone. There were also visits of senior Catholic hierarchs to Ukraine, with the mission to 
support charitable activities. This was one of the purposes of Pietro Cardinal Parolin, 
the Vatican’s Secretary of state, to come to Ukraine in June 2016. It should also be noted 
that the Catholic charitable organizations have operated on both sides of the conflict.
Reactions from the World Council of Churches
Christian churches usually hesitate to make explicit comments on political 
developments. In contrast to them, the World Council of Churches (WCC), which 
connects most of them to an ecumenical network, is always outspoken about political 
events, especially when they involve violence. However, just as in the case of the war 
29 “Full Text of Joint Declaration Signed by Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill,” Article 26, Catholic 
News Agency, February 12, 2016, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y6y7zd47.
30 “Full Text of Joint Declaration Signed by Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill,” Article 9.
31 “‘Pope for Ukraine’ Project,” Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development, November 18, 
2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/yywkx6m7.
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in Georgia, the WCC remained disturbingly silent about the drama that evolved in the 
East of Ukraine. Not a single word came from official spokespersons of this ecumenical 
organization for a long time.
The silence was broken only when the Malaysian Airlines Boeing was downed on 
July 17, 2014. Then, WCC Associate General Secretary Isabel Apawo Phiri promulgated 
a message of solidarity addressed to Dutch churches. In the message, there was a vague 
reference to “justice and righteousness”: “This call demands our concern for all those 
who are deprived of their inherent and inalienable rights and dignity, of fullness of 
life and equal justice.” 32 Nevertheless, the message failed to provide justice or to hint 
at why this catastrophe happened. There was a reference to Russia in the message but 
in a positive light. It was stated that the message was sent in response to the call for 
solidarity from “member churches in Russia.”
The WCC addressed the war in Ukraine for the first time only in February 2015, 
one year after it began. The message came from WCC Acting General Secretary Georges 
Lemopoulos, who also represented the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the organization. 
It endorsed the agreement of a ceasefire. There were many such agreements about a 
ceasefire in Ukraine, not one ever being kept, including the one to which the message 
referred. The WCC took the opportunity of one such agreement to address the 
Ukrainian situation:
The World Council of Churches welcomes the announcement 
yesterday of the ceasefire agreement for eastern Ukraine negotiated 
in Minsk. We express our sincere appreciation to all parties to 
these negotiations for this first step together towards peace, and 
to the leaders of Germany and France for their facilitation of the 
negotiations. The deaths and damage — and the confrontation and 
distrust within the international community — resulting from the 
conflict in Ukraine must be brought to an end. The elements of 
the new ceasefire agreement offer building blocks for a peaceful 
and principled resolution of the situation. A delegation organized 
by the WCC is expected to visit Ukraine in March, at which time 
we hope to see tangible signs of progress towards sustainable 
peace, and to accompany and strengthen that progress. In the 
meantime, the WCC urges all parties to the conflict to continue 
their steps towards peace, to maintain a commitment to dialogue 
and diplomacy, and to refrain from further violence that only can 
cause greater human suffering in Ukraine and deepen the rift 
in the social and political fabric of the region and in the wider 
international community.33
32 “Solidarity Message for Dutch Churches over Malaysia Airlines Disaster,” World Council of 
Churches, July 22, 2014, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y6ect8mt.
33 “Statement on Ukraine Ceasefire Agreement,” World Council of Churches, February 13, 2015, 
accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/yyjz8sqk.
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The statement, thus, announced a visit of a WCC delegation to Ukraine. The visit 
indeed took place from March 17 to 20, 2015. The delegation had a high profile, as it 
included WCC General Secretary Olav Fykse Tveit. It also included Rev. Karin van den 
Broeke from the Protestant Church in the Netherlands, Metropolitan Gennadios of 
Sassima from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Catherine Gordon from the Presbyterian 
Church in the United States, Archpriest Mikhail Goundiaev from the Moscow 
Patriarchate, Bishop Christopher Hill from the Church of England, who at that time 
was also president of the Conference of European Churches, Bishop Jan Janssen from 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Oldenburg, Germany, and Archbishop Emeritus 
Anders Wejryd from the Church of Sweden.
Two members of the delegation visited the East of the country and met with people 
there. Some other members also visited a shelter for internally displaced persons near 
Kyiv. There were also two official meetings: one with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
(Moscow Patriarchate) and the other with the All- Ukrainian Council of Churches and 
Religious Organizations. Following the visit, the delegation published a communique, 
which included the following statements:
The delegation sought to express solidarity with the churches and 
people of Ukraine in the context of the conflict in the eastern part 
of the country following the 2013–2014 Maidan events. Further, the 
delegation came to listen to the experiences and perspectives of the 
churches and other partners in Ukraine, and to discern ways in which 
the WCC and the ecumenical movement might be able to support 
and strengthen efforts by Ukrainian churches and faith communities 
to promote an end to conflict and a just peace and reconciliation in 
Ukraine. The visit was facilitated by the WCC’s member church in 
Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), to 
whom we express our sincere appreciation.
During this visit, the delegation heard direct testimonies from 
church leaders and state representatives concerning the severe 
humanitarian impact of the violence in the affected regions. 
Delegation members had the opportunity to visit a displaced 
persons’ shelter in Kiev and were able to encounter people who 
had been obliged to flee from the fighting. Delegation members 
were also able to travel close to the conflict zone, near Lisichansk, 
and to witness for themselves the destruction and disruption 
resulting from the crisis. The delegation also heard of the central 
role being played by churches in providing humanitarian aid in 
the affected regions, though the unmet needs still remain very 
great. Collectively, these experiences have underlined the critical 
situation for the people and communities most directly affected, 
the urgent need to increase humanitarian assistance to them, and 
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the necessity of resolving this conflict in order to prevent even 
worse human suffering.
During this visit, the delegation has heard different perspectives on 
the origins of the conflict. In any event, the delegation is convinced 
of the potential of the churches and faith communities of Ukraine 
to play a lead role in transcending the competing nationalisms 
that predispose groups toward conflict, in addressing the social, 
economic and humanitarian needs that have been compounded 
by the fighting, and in promoting unity and reconciliation among 
all people of Ukraine.34
The text of the communique, on the one hand, acknowledges the vast humanitarian 
crisis caused by the conflict. On the other hand, its interpretation of the conflict is 
disappointingly close to some points of Russian propaganda. Thus, it has presented the 
war as a clash of “competing nationalisms.” Such an interpretation, however, misses 
the essence of what happened in Ukraine during the Maidan and its aftermath. The 
Revolution of Dignity was not a nationalist insurgence but a struggle of civil society 
for the rule of law and against corruption. The majority of the people who fight on the 
Ukrainian side in the East of the country are Russian speaking and are not Ukrainian 
nationalists. The Russian propaganda, however, presents them as nationalists, and the 
WCC communique repeats this point.
The communique repeated another point of the Russian propaganda, namely that 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate represents a key to 
bringing peace to Ukraine. In fact, this church failed even to acknowledge that there is 
a war. Regarding this, the document states:
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) has a key role to play in the 
search for peace, unity and reconciliation. As the majority church 
in Ukraine — with congregations in all parts of the country and on 
both sides of the line of conflict — and having officially declared 
and reiterated its commitment to the territorial integrity and 
unity of Ukraine, the UOC has a special capacity and leadership 
responsibility in this regard.35
Many Christians in Ukraine were upset by the communique and suspected 
anti- Ukrainian bias in its statements. The delegation promised “to promote a more 
adequate humanitarian response to the human suffering resulting from the conflict, 
and to support and strengthen the efforts of the churches and faith communities of 
Ukraine for justice and peace.” This promise was not fulfilled, however, because, after 
34 “Communiqué by WCC Delegation to Ukraine,” World Council of Churches, March 20, 2015, 
accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y3nqnmov.
35 “Communiqué by WCC Delegation to Ukraine.”
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the communique in March 2015, not a single statement on the war in Ukraine appeared 
on the website of the WCC. There were also no reactions from the WCC to other 
humanitarian issues connected with Ukraine, such as Ukrainian political prisoners 
in Russia, to which the international community and individual churches responded 
with vigor and criticism.
Ukrainian Autocephaly as a Reaction to the War
Many Christians in Ukraine were astonished or even shocked by the silence or 
misleading messages from the Orthodox, Catholic, and other churches, as well as 
from ecumenical organizations such as the WCC. At the same time, they were not 
surprised that the Russian church endorsed the aggression. For many, in the first place, 
this church was behind it, in the capacity of an ideological partner of the Kremlin. The 
profound involvement of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Russian aggression against 
Ukraine created a powerful momentum for the Ukrainian Orthodox faithful to seek 
their ecclesial independence from Moscow.
The initial momentum for Ukrainian autocephaly came from the faithful, 
subsequently facilitated by the Ukrainian state, and eventually fulfilled by the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate. For the Ukrainian state, the issue of the ecclesial independence of Ukraine 
was not only ecclesiastical but also political. The Russian Orthodox Church directly 
and through its outpost in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, systematically 
weakened Ukrainian resistance to the Kremlin and sometimes overtly promoted the 
anti- Ukrainian agenda of the latter. Besides this, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, 
who became a protagonist of Ukrainian autocephaly, hoped to improve his political 
support in the upcoming presidential elections in the spring of 2019.
For the Ecumenical Patriarchate, it seems, the issue was minimally political and 
mostly pastoral. Millions of Ukrainians, who associated themselves with the non- 
canonical Orthodox churches: the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church, were regarded by the rest of the Orthodox world as schismatics. 
Autocephaly was the only way for them to be reconciled with the rest of global 
Orthodoxy. The Ecumenical Patriarchate is an institution in the Orthodox Church, 
most appropriate for granting autocephaly. This church also demonstrated the most 
compassion for the sensitivities of the Ukrainian people. It more than any other church 
seemed to acknowledge the reality of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Although 
Constantinople did not openly condemn this aggression and instead used euphemisms 
to express its concerns, even those euphemisms were appreciated in Ukraine. The most 
eloquent and powerful message of support for the Ukrainian people was granting 
autocephaly to their Orthodox church.
The decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was announced by President 
Poroshenko during his meeting with the heads of political factions in the Ukrainian 
Parliament on April 17, 2018.36 Poroshenko informed them about his visit to the 
36 Petro Poroshenko, “Napysav ofitsiine zvernennia do Vselenskoho Patriarkha iz prokhanniam 
nadaty Tomos [I Have Written an Official Appeal to Ecumenical Patriarch Asking Him to Grant 
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residence of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul during the week after the Orthodox 
Easter (April 8), where he had conversations with Patriarch Bartholomew and the 
members of the Synod. They announced to him their decision to proceed with granting 
the Ukrainian church autocephaly.
Upon his return to Ukraine, President Poroshenko met with the hierarchs of all 
Orthodox churches in Ukraine and asked for their support of his initiative. The Kyiv 
Patriarchate and the UOAC unanimously endorsed the President and promulgated 
official requests to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The primate of the UOC MP 
Metropolitan Onufriy refused to support the initiative. Nevertheless, some bishops 
from his church agreed to participate in the process, even though their names were 
not disclosed. After these consultations, President Poroshenko sent to Istanbul his 
own official request to proceed with autocephaly. On April 19, the President asked 
the Parliament to support his request, and the Rada passed a relevant decision with 
a majority of votes.37 Petro Poroshenko, thus, became the primary mediator for the 
Ukrainian churches and political bodies in their communication with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate. He swiftly secured formal support by the Ukrainian Parliament and most 
Ukrainian churches, with the UOC predictably abstaining.
Many in Ukraine believed at that time that autocephaly would be granted soon, 
by the end of spring or the latest in July, when the Ukrainian churches would celebrate 
the 1030th anniversary of the baptism of Kyiv. However, the relevant decisions of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate were taken only during fall 2018. In the first days of September, 
from the 1st to the 3rd, a Synaxis of bishops from the Ecumenical Patriarchate was held 
in Istanbul. The role of this institution is rather advisory, but it usually convenes prior 
to the Holy Synod making its most important decisions. In September 2018, the Synaxis 
was assembled in the wake of the decision on Ukrainian autocephaly. On the first day 
of the Synaxis, its delegates listened to papers and participated in discussions relevant 
to the Ukrainian situation. In particular, its historical background, as well as the right 
of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to grant autocephaly and entertain appeals from other 
churches, were in the focus of deliberations by the Synaxis.
Soon after the Synaxis accomplished its work, on September 7, the Secretariat of 
the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate issued a statement about appointing 
two Patriarchal exarchs to Ukraine.38 They were Archbishop Daniel of Pamphilon 
from the United States and Bishop Ilarion of Edmonton from Canada. The mission 
of exarchs in the Ecumenical Patriarchate is similar to the mission of legates in the 
Catholic church. They represent the Patriarch and give account to him. They cannot 
a Tomos],” Facebook, April 17, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y6tr28yf.
37 Ukrainian Parliament Resolution 2410-VIII, “Pro pidtrymku zvernennia Prezydenta Ukrainy 
do Vselenskoho Patriarkha Varfolomiia pro nadannia Tomosu pro avtokefaliiu Pravoslavnoi 
Tserkvy v Ukraini [On the Support for the President’s of Ukraine Appeal to Ecumenical 
Patriarch Bartholomew on Granting a Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of 
Ukraine],” April 19, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/yym4lcsw.
38 Ecumenical Patriarchate, “Announcement,” Facebook, September 7, 2018, accessed December 
5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y38cxaf9.
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act by their own authority and do not exercise the power of a diocesan bishop in the 
places to where they have been sent. A particular mission of the exarchs in Ukraine 
was to prepare the unifying council of the church.
The exarchs who visited Ukraine returned with their report to the Holy Synod, 
which held its session on October 9–11. Many in Ukraine expected that the Synod at 
this session would grant a Tomos of Ukrainian autocephaly. These expectations were 
fulfilled only partially. According to the communique published by the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate,39 it decided to take the following steps. The most important was to declare 
that the faithful of the non- canonical churches “have been restored to communion 
with the Church.” This declaration meant the end of the schism that had existed in 
Ukraine since 1992.
The Synod in Constantinople also annulled the document of 1686 that had granted 
the church of Moscow temporarily and conditionally, according to Constantinople, 
management over the Metropolia of Kyiv. This effectively restored Constantinople’s 
canonical jurisdiction over Ukraine in the form of a Metropolia. The Ukrainian church 
became a canonical structure similar to the one that had been established in the 10th 
century and existed until 1686. The decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate also 
meant that Constantinople does not recognize any existent jurisdiction in Ukraine 
except its own. Both the Kyiv Patriarchate and the UAOC were supposed to abolish 
themselves and to establish a new ecclesial group, which would receive recognition and 
independence from Constantinople. Simultaneously, Constantinople made it clear that 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate ceased to exist. The 
Ecumenical Patriarch effectively announced this in his letter to Metropolitan Onufriy 
on October 12, the next day after the Synod in Constantinople. In his letter, Patriarch 
Bartholomew acknowledged Metropolitan Onufriy as the bishop of Kyiv by concession. 
He also warned him that after the new primate of the Ukrainian church would be 
elected the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Onufriy would not be able to hold this title. Onufriy, 
reportedly, did not respond to the letter and sent it back to Istanbul.40
By the decision of the same Synodal session in Constantinople, the primates of 
the Kyiv Patriarchate and UAOC, Filaret and Makariy respectively, were restored to the 
ranks they had before they were deposed by Moscow. Constantinople did this in the 
frame of its right to entertain appeals from other jurisdictions. The Synodal session also 
recognized the consecrations of bishops made in the two non- canonical jurisdictions.
At its last session in 2018, on November 27–29, the Synod of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate made another step towards granting autocephaly to the Ukrainian church. 
39 Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Holy and Sacred Synod, “Announcement,” The Ecumenical 
Patriarchate, October 11, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y3v2vy4g.
40 “Blazhennishyi Mytropolyt Onufriy povernuv lyst Patriarkha Varfolomiia nazad u Stambul 
[His Beatitude Metropolitan Onufriy Returned a Letter From Patriarch Bartholomew Back 
to Istanbul],” Ukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkva, December 8, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, 
https://tinyurl.com/y39y4opm.
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It approved the draft of a Constitutional charter (Statute) for the new church.41 The 
draft was based on the Constitutional Charter of the Orthodox Church of Greece. It was 
only a draft, which could be modified, if necessary, and then accepted by the Ukrainian 
bishops. The November session of the Synod in Istanbul also approved the draft of the 
Ukrainian Tomos. At the same time, the Tomos was not yet published or promulgated.
The Tomos would be granted to the new church in Ukraine, which had yet to 
establish itself. The so- called unifying council, where the new church was established, 
took place in the historical St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv on December 15, 2018, under the 
presidency of the exarch from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Metropolitan Emmanuel of 
France. On the eve of the council, the Kyiv Patriarchate and the UAOC disestablished 
themselves. All their bishops, plus two bishops from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
under the Moscow Patriarchate, took part in the council, now in the new capacity of the 
bishops of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. At the council, the Statute of the new church 
was adopted, and its new primate elected: Metropolitan Epiphaniy Dumenko. The new 
church named itself The Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
On January 6, 2019, Metropolitan Epiphaniy, accompanied by President Petro 
Poroshenko, visited Istanbul. At the residence of the Ecumenical Patriarch at Phanar, 
he received the Tomos for Ukrainian autocephaly. The document was first signed by 
Patriarch Bartholomew, and later by members of the Holy Synod of the Church of 
Constantinople. This solemn act finalized the process of granting the Ukrainian church 
its canonical independence (autocephaly).
The Reception of Ukrainian Autocephaly in the Orthodox World
The rules of the Panorthodox Commonwealth require that a new autocephalous church 
should be accepted by other autocephalous churches. When the Orthodox Church of 
Ukraine received its Tomos in January 2019, only the Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized 
it. Other churches hesitated to do so. In this way, they effectively demonstrated their 
attitude to the war in Ukraine. Given that granting autocephaly was a reaction to the 
war, the delayed recognition of this autocephaly by other local churches meant that they 
continued keeping a blind eye to the war. The situation changed after the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate pressed some local churches to recognize the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. 
By the end of 2020, the Church of Greece, the Patriarchate of Alexandria, and the 
Church of Cyprus recognized the autocephalous church in Ukraine.
The reaction of the Russian Orthodox Church to the decisions of the mentioned 
churches to recognize Ukrainian autocephaly was predictable. It both backed the war 
and openly opposed Ukrainian autocephaly. During his visit to Phanar at the end of 
August 2018, the Patriarch of Moscow Kirill tried to convince Patriarch Bartholomew 
not to proceed with the Tomos. After this attempt failed, the Holy Synod of the Russian 
Orthodox Church at its extraordinary session on September 8 declared “the decision 
41 Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Holy and Sacred Synod, “Communiqué,” The Ecumenical 
Patriarchate, November 29, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y3m4gsvg.
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of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople… as a severe violation of 
church canons.” 42 On September 14, at another extraordinary session, the same Synod 
decided “to suspend the liturgical prayerful commemoration of Patriarch Bartholomew 
of Constantinople” and “the con- celebration with hierarchs of the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople.” 43 After the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on October 11 to 
end the schism in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, the reaction of Moscow was somewhat, not 
much, stronger. On October 15, the Synod of the Russian church ceased Eucharistic 
communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.44 However, it did not proceed toward 
a fully- fledged schism.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate acted in 
complete coherence with the Moscow Patriarchate and adopted similar decisions. 
Its council of bishops adopted a decision in Kyiv to break communion with the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate on November 13, 2018.45 The council was convened for the 
first time following Metropolitan Onufriy’s election as primate of the church to discuss 
the invitation by President Poroshenko to meet with bishops of the UOC. The bishops 
decided to decline the invitation.46 They thus refused to engage in conversation with 
Ukrainian political authorities.
In contrast, the Moscow Patriarchate secured the support of the Russian state in 
rebuking Ukrainian autocephaly. As a result, for example, Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sergey Lavrov made the following statement in his interview to RT France, Paris 
Match, and Figaro:
As regards the church problems, the interference [of the state] 
in the life of the church is prohibited by law in Ukraine, Russia, 
and, I hope, in any other normal state. However, when the special 
representative of the USA on questions of church relations openly 
welcomes the decision of Patriarch Bartholomew, when K. Volker,47 
42 “Zhurnal zasedaniia Sviashchennogo Sinoda № 68 [Minutes of the Holy Synod, Minute 
No. 68],” Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov, September 8, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, 
https://tinyurl.com/yxqwh4qf.
43 “Minutes of the Holy Synod, Minute No. 69,” Russian Orthodox Church, September 14, 2018, 
accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y23bseyt.
44 “Zhurnal zasedaniia Sviashchennogo Sinoda № 71 [Minutes of the Holy Synod, Minute No. 71],” 
Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov, October 15, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.
com/y356aym9.
45 “Resolution of the Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of November 13, 2018,” 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church, November 14, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.
com/yxdfeowm.
46 See “Statement of Council of Bishops of Ukrainian Orthodox Church Regarding Meeting 
with President of Ukraine P. O. Poroshenko,” Ukrainian Orthodox Church, November 14, 2018, 
accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y2vlth3h.
47 Kurt Volker was at that time a U.S. special representative for Ukraine.
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who is supposed, on behalf of the USA, to contribute to Ukrainian 
normalization on the basis of the Minsk agreements, makes his 
statements about these processes, in this case we say: if the shoe 
fits, wear it.48
The irony about this statement is that it represented clear political interference 
in church affairs. Moreover, the statement by Lavrov followed a meeting of Russian 
President Vladimir Putin with permanent members of the Security Council on October 
12, including the Minister of Defense, directors of the FSB and the Foreign Intelligence 
Service. This meeting was dedicated exclusively to the Ukrainian church issue. It seems 
the issue had become of extreme importance in Russian politics.
While Russian reactions to the Ukrainian Tomos were predictable, some other 
local churches disappointed with their statements, which anyone hardly expected them 
to make, on the same issue. One such statement came from the Orthodox Church 
in America (OCA). This church, which was granted autocephaly by the Moscow 
Patriarchate in 1970, struggles with the same issue of the lack of recognition from other 
churches. However, it did not demonstrate any empathy with the Ukrainian church, 
which found itself in the same canonical situation. Instead, on January 28, 2019, the 
Synod of the OCA issued a statement, which effectively called to ignore decisions of 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate regarding Ukraine.49
Even more contradictory was the decision of the Orthodox Church of Poland. 
This church was granted autocephaly in 1924 by the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the 
same grounds that Constantinople used to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church 
of Ukraine. Yet, the Church of Poland ignored these grounds and thus undermined 
its own autocephaly. On November 15, 2018, the council of bishops of the Orthodox 
Church of Poland took a decision regarding the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, by 
which it refused to recognize all the acts that the Ecumenical Patriarchate undertook 
regarding Ukraine.50
48 “Interviu Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S. V. Lavrova ‘RT Frans,’ ‘Pari Match’ i ‘Figaro’ 
[Interview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S. V. Lavrov to RT France, Paris Match, 
and Figaro],” Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, October 18, 2018, accessed 
December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y4jo62bm.
49 “Holy Synod of Bishops Issues Archpastoral Letter on Ukraine,” Orthodox Church in America, 
January 28, 2019, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y4xj6w2p.
50 “Osoby pozbawione święceń biskupich i kapłańskich nie mogą być liderami przy 
wprowadzaniu pokoju w Prawosławnym Kościele Ukraińskim. Ich działania powodują 
jeszcze większy zamęt i zgorszenie… Święty Sobór Biskupów zabrania duchownym Polskiego 
Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego wchodzenia w liturgiczno- modlitewne kontakty 
z ‘duchownymi’ tzw. ‘Patriarchatu Kijowskiego’ i tzw. ‘Autokefalicznej Cerkwi’, które w 
dotychczasowych działaniach uczyniły wiele zła.” See “Komunikat Kancelarii Św. Soboru 
Biskupów,” Oficjalna Strona Polskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego, November 15, 
2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.com/y55bu6fg.
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Reactions of the Vatican to the Tomos
The Vatican considered the Ukrainian situation as intra- Orthodox and therefore refused 
to express any official standpoint in its regards. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church 
(UGCC), which informally supported Ukrainian autocephaly, officially remained 
neutral. Thus, after he met with Pope Francis on July 3, 2018, the Primate of the UGCC, 
Archbishop Sviatoslav, came out with the following official statement:
We evaluate positively the efforts to overcome division in 
Ukrainian Orthodoxy, in accordance with the ancient principle 
salus animarum lex suprema est. At the same time, we consider 
these processes an internal affair of the Orthodox side and in no 
case interfere with these processes and do not participate in them. 
We are convinced that secular authorities are obliged to provide 
the necessary conditions for the free development of all churches 
in our state, and it is unacceptable if they treat any Church as 
established.51
Conclusions
Christian churches of different denominations in different countries of the world, in 
most cases, failed to acknowledge the sufferings of the Ukrainian people caused by war. 
They also failed to condemn the role of Russia in the war. Their standpoint regarding 
the war and Russia has been much weaker than the positions of most international 
organizations and national governments in the West. The only church that adequately 
addressed the Ukrainian issue is the Ecumenical Patriarchate. It has demonstrated 
genuine compassion for the suffering Ukrainian people by granting autocephaly to 
their church.
Alarming is the silence of many local Orthodox churches regarding the war in 
Ukraine and their adverse reactions to the initiative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 
Not only that many of them have appeased Russian politics, but they have also been 
quick to rebuke the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Some of them, in 
this way, effectively undermined their own autocephaly. Among the reasons for such 
appalling blindness about the war in Ukraine is the deficiency of Orthodox social 
ethics. In contrast to them, the Vatican and international ecumenical organizations 
have strong social ethics. Still, they have not done enough to properly acknowledge the 
perpetrators in the Ukrainian war and the humanitarian crisis it has caused.
51 “Sviatishyi Otets podiakuvav UGKTs za svidchennia yednosti Khrystovoi Tserkvy [His 
Holiness Thanked the UGCC for Its Witness of Unity of Christ’s Church],” Informatsiinyi resurs 
Ukrainskoi Hreko- Katolytskoi Tserkvy, July 3, 2018, accessed December 5, 2020, https://tinyurl.
com/y2eupykt.
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